

An Institutional Mission That Nobody Wants to Accomplish

Actors and Interests in the Genesis of the East African Political Federation

*Alexander Makulilo**

*Alexander Stroh***

*Rodrick Henry****

Abstract

Is the political federation of East Africa an institutional mission that nobody wants to fulfil? The long history of this aspiration suggests at least that fundamental challenges persist as much as the will to go forward with political integration in the region. This contribution identifies political cycles taken by the project of deep political integration in the East African region. We argue that these cycles followed a very similar logic since independence. There is little evidence that the political will has ever been strong enough to accomplish the mission. Paradoxically, political federation has not disappeared from the regional agenda although partner states have not worked effectively to realise it. We note that confederation has currently been opted as part of a necessary lag strategy with preference for non-implementation of the federation.

Key words:

Political Federation, East African Community, Integration, Institutionalism, Colonialism

1 Introduction

The East African Community (EAC) was “arguably the most sophisticated regional cooperative arrangement undertaken in the Third World.”¹ However, writing these lines John Ravenhill referred to the ‘old’ or ‘first’ regional community of states that carried the same name and was founded by the same countries, namely, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Today, the ‘new’ or ‘second’ EAC has been enlarged to six members so called Partner States and still aspires after ambitious targets, whose achievement would definitely turn the community into one of the most sophisticated regional cooperation arrangements in the world. The EAC’s ultimate aim is comprehensive political integration in form of a federation.²

This is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, no other regional economic integration mechanism has, so far, defined an ultimate political aim for the community, not even the European Union. Second, the original EAC member countries had failed to sustain

* Associate Professor, University of Dar es Salaam (Email: makulilo76@udsm.ac.tz)

** Junior Professor, University of Bayreuth (Email: alexander.stroh@uni-bayreuth.de)

*** Lecturer, University of Dar-es-Salaam (Email: henryrodrick@yahoo.com)

¹John Ravenhill, ‘Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community’ [1979] 17 *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 227.

²Art. 5(2), 11(3), 123(1), 123(3)(f) and 123(6) Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.

federal arrangements in earlier decades due to political differences. One may argue that political disputes have changed but not disappeared, not among the three founding members of the communities and much less among all six partner states of today, which include conflict-ridden countries such as Burundi and South Sudan besides a relatively stable Rwandan state that, on the other hand, might not share all political values with the founding partners.

In this contribution, we thus ask, why such an ambitious aim as formation of a political federation was included in the Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community of 1999 – subsequently ‘the Treaty’ – and what are prospects for accomplishment of this institutional mission at this point in time? Given the EAC’s prominent institutional past, we assume that roots of answers to both of the two questions lie in history. In the following three sections, first, we will present our systematic approach to the problem. We anchor our analysis in historical institutionalism,³ which compels us to consider the power of legacies and stickiness of the status quo instead of rushing into interpretations of recent political details. The second section will recap the history of political integration in East Africa, which begins long before the recent, hardly 20-years old EAC Treaty. Third, we present our interpretation of challenges that political integration meets today due to specific interrelations between legacies and contemporary interests. Finally, the conclusion provides some reflections about prospects for accomplishment of the federation plan and cautious policy recommendations.

2 Approach

The EAC is part of regional economic communities (RECs) that the African Union has recognized as organisations, which represent Africa’s sub-regions. Emphasis on economic integration avoids complications amongst the broad range of political regimes on the continent. However, most RECs also have a political and security agenda but, similar to the European Union’s role model, most regional communities began with economic integration efforts. The EAC is no exception to that strategy. The first three aims in a planned sequence of four integration steps are economic in nature. The community seeks to create, first, a customs union; second, a common market; and third, a monetary union before, ultimately, a political federation shall be targeted. What is different about the EAC is this last step. The Treaty adds an ambitious project of political integration to several levels of economic integration.

Political integration is the process of passing political competencies from one sovereign governmental entity, typically, nation-states, to a geographically larger political entity, typically, a regional community of states. This actually has a long history in East Africa. It even began before sovereign modern states existed in the region as we will provide detail in the next section. Federating administrative units of what are today Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was, at first, a colonial project of the British for the sake of efficient governance. But also in postcolonial times, the first edition of an EAC, which lasted from 1967 to 1977 was a by-product of an ambitious political integration agenda. The agenda

³Peter A Hall and Rosemary CR Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’ (1996) 44 *Political Studies* 936; Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective’ (1999) 2 *Annual Review of Political Science* 369; Sven Steinmo, ‘Historical Institutionalism’ in Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (eds), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective* (Cambridge University Press 2008).

substantially built on Julius Nyerere's ideas about unity and federation as an instrument to provide East Africans with a stronger political administration.⁴

This short historical review suggests that the aim to federate East Africa has at least two historical roots, colonial plans for greater efficiency and lower costs as well as the pan-Africanist project for strength by unity and service delivery. We argue that recent debates cannot be disconnected from the past. Thus, we follow traces of both historical paths laid down decades before adoption of the 1999 Treaty. However, we do not attempt to write a history of regional integration but seek to analyse countervailing and enabling forces of the past in 'episodes' of potential institutional change in recent times. Institutional change that we are interested in is political integration and prospects for an East African Federation. We focus on critical developments in the EAC's institutional evolution starting with establishment of the Treaty that had path-shaping potential.

Historical institutionalists argue that institutions, regulations and rules such as constitutional provisions or technical standards, are generally sticky and relatively hard to change. Long institutional legacies may reinforce such 'stickiness' of the status quo. Institutional change is only possible under extraordinary contingent conditions or in very slow incremental processes. Consequently, we have to carefully trace the institutional legacy to assess chances for implementation of a political federation. The peculiar nature of the ultimate aim in the Treaty is of particular importance. On one hand, the aim obliges partner states to work towards realization and ultimately, to realize the federation. On the other hand, we might wonder if such codified aim constitutes an institution in line with historical institutionalist thinking because the federation has not (yet) been established under the current Treaty.

We conceive this ambivalent nature of the Treaty's ultimate political aim to be a fruitful starting point for analysis of the ongoing political integration process in the EAC. We argue that the ambition to establish the federation has become an institutionalised aspiration that is both, hard to repeal and hard to realize. We further argue that stickiness of the aspiration and trickiness of its implementation have led the region into political cycles of the federation project. We find little evidence that the political will has ever been strong enough to accomplish the institutional mission, but there might be an awkward symbiosis between keeping alive of the political integration agenda and chances to realize previous steps of preceding steps of economic integration as codified in the Treaty.

Five historical 'anchors' serve as analytical episodes in which effects of institutionalized aspirations and contemporary interests are analysed. Original semi-structured interviews at the EAC headquarters and with key actors in capitals of all three founding partner states –Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – inform the analysis alongside systematic review of official reports and communiqués from EAC decision-making bodies as well as archival information from leading newspapers in the original partner states. The five analytical episodes are, first, Treaty negotiations up to 1999; second, the 2004 fast-track initiative for political integration; third, the 2007 community enlargement by Burundi and Rwanda; fourth, the 2013 mini fast-tracking initiative; and fifth, the second community enlargement of 2016 when South Sudan joined the EAC.

⁴Julius Nyerere, 'Freedom and Unity' (1964) 'Transition' 40.

3 The pre-1999 Institutional Legacy

Early attempts towards formation of the EAC political federation appeared for the first time during the colonial era. Three colonial secretaries, namely, Winston Churchill (1921-1922), Leo Amery (1924-1929) and Oliver Lyttelton (1951-1954) seemed to favour and support establishment of the East African Federation. Therefore, the federation project during the imperial history was intertwined with the colonial motive of easing exploitation of the colonised territories in order to realise super profits. In due regard, a federation was called for as a strategy of attaining efficiency and lowering costs. The initial move to bring together the East African colonies started with construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway from 1896 to 1901. The strategic reason behind construction of the railway was means for the British to link Mombasa with their Uganda protectorate. Yet, the scope and initiatives to federate deepened, especially after the end of the First World War in 1918/19 when Allied Powers led by Britain emerged as victorious powers. Britain was given Tanganyika as a mandate territory. Such move made the entire of the East African colonies – Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika (now Mainland Tanzania) – to be under the British colonial rule. It should be emphasised that the four colonial territories were different in terms of potentials to be harnessed by the colonial state. Hence, the degree of investment by the colonial state varied significantly. To be sure, Kenya, then a settler colony seemed to have a higher level of investment of the industrial base than its counterparts Tanzania and Uganda. Thus, most of the infrastructures were directed to Kenya. Although Walter Rodney would call such phenomenon as “development by contradiction,”⁵ the industrial base inherited by Kenya as well as the capitalist ideology shaped the way the three EAC countries have related towards establishing the EAC integration entity.

As stated before, the attempt to federate the three British East African colonies of Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda got impetus from some colonial secretaries, especially after the First World War. As part of the process, the British colonial government established a commission in 1924, which was led by Ormsby-Gore to consider feasibility of a federation for the three British colonies. The Commission put that:

We found little, if any, support in East Africa for the idea of immediate federation, and in some quarters we found definite hostility. We received a memorial against federation from the King and native Government of Buganda, and discussions which had taken place in parts of Kenya immediately prior to our arrival revealed that the suggestion was viewed with more than a little suspicion by all sections of European opinion in Kenya. All shades of opinion in Zanzibar are hostile to federation, and we also received representations against federation from various Indian Associations throughout the three northern territories. But, apart altogether from these expressions of opinion, we came definitely to the conclusion that any attempt at federation would be premature. Geographical conditions and the lack of communications would be a serious obstacle. Federal government would be expensive and cumbersome: it would curtail in many directions the freedom of action which now belongs to the local Governments, and would lead to delay in all local government matters which require reference to the Secretary of State. Moreover,

⁵ Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Tanzania Publishing House 1972).

it is very doubtful whether a Governor-General and super-staff in East Africa would materially reduce the amount of correspondence between the East African Governments and the Colonial Office.⁶

The idea of federation was also resisted by the Governor of Tanganyika because it sought to entrench dominance of Kenya settlers.⁷ The Ormsby-Gore report revealed at least three barriers towards establishment of the federation. The first one is the fact that the federation was not a profitable undertaking hence, it was against the previously held view by the colonial government of reducing costs. The second clear finding is that people in the colonies as well as the colonial states resisted the idea of federation so as to protect their own interests. The third issue emerging out of this report is that the idea to federate turned to be a symbol of mutual distrust among colonial territories of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

In 1927, another commission was formed and led by Hilton Young. The commission was tasked to carry out a further study on possibilities of establishing a federation. The outcome of the study was that the time was not yet ripe for establishing the East African federation. Nonetheless, it recommended for formation of an institution to coordinate common services.⁸ It was not until 1948 that the British colonial authorities managed to institutionalise cooperation among the three East African territories by creating the East African High Commission (EAHC) of Governors with its headquarters in Nairobi. Thus, the EAHC enacted laws to regulate services such as railways and harbours, posts and telegraphs, revenue allocation and income tax management.

Hence, taking the colonial history into account, it is safe to state that while the British colonial government failed to federate the three colonies, it managed to create the East African High Commission (EAHC) of Governors in 1948 to coordinate some services in the region. The process, though intended to further exploit smoothly the East African colonies, laid a foundation for later efforts by post-independent governments to federate the three countries of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. In June 1961, delegations from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and EAHC officials went to London to discuss the future of the EAHC with the United Kingdom (UK) government. It was agreed that any constitutional changes to come after independence should maintain services by the EAHC and that the EAHC should be replaced by the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO).

The desire to federate the EAC countries immediately after their respective independence is founded on ideals of the Pan-African Movement. There were a series of Pan-African movement conferences in 1900, 1919, 1921 and 1923. However, the conference of 1945 was critical for Africa since it was attended by some African leaders such as Jomo Kenyatta and Kwame Nkrumah. The 1945 conference was concerned with among other things, anti-colonialism, the demand for national independence in Africa and rights of black people, in general. That could be achieved if there were unity and solidarity among Africans. It was against this background that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 by countries that attained independence. Inspired by the philosophy of Pan-Africanism, African states sought a way of consolidating their new independence and pursuing ideals of African Unity. However, there were two opposing groups on how

⁶ East Africa. Report of the East Africa Commission. Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, April, 1925.

⁷ Catherine P. Biira, 'Crafting a Political Union: Collective Identity Dynamics in the East African Community' (CUEA PRESS 2017) 25.

⁸ Msuya Mangachi, *African Regional Integration: East African Experience* (Safari Books, 2011) 28.

African unity could be achieved. The first group known as the Casablanca group and led by President Kwame Nkrumah called for immediate political integration and creation of a supranational body. In contrast, the moderate group popularly known as the Monrovia group called for a gradual approach towards African unity. Explaining the position of the second group, Mwalimu Nyerere once remarked that “Our goal must be a United States of Africa... This goal must be achieved, and it does not matter whether this is done by one step or many or through economic, political or social development...”⁹ Thus, the desire to create one African government was conceived in a step-by-step process as proposed by the Monrovia group.

A persistent attempt at political federation in East Africa after independence appeared in two official documents, namely, the Declaration of Federation signed on 5th June 1963 by Prime Ministers Milton Obote of Uganda, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika. The declaration was a precursor to negotiations of a federal constitution. The three leaders, inspired by the philosophy of Pan-Africanism, pledged to establish the political Federation of East Africa beyond parochial interests of national states, tribalism and racialism. The second document is the 1999 Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community in which political federation was considered the ultimate goal of the integration. We will discuss the second document later.

It is imperative to mention here that following the 1963 Declaration of Federation, the major outcome was drafting of the East African Federation Constitution of 1963. Article 1 of the Constitution stated that, “there shall be established a Federal Republic to be known as the Federal Republic of Eastern Africa.” The federation was a sovereign state and comprised of Tanganyika, Uganda, Kenya and Zanzibar. By this provision of the constitution, it means that sovereignty of individual states was supposed to cease immediately the constitution would come into force. However, the constitution was not endorsed and hence, the federation could not materialise.

There are three fundamental problems, which made the 1963 attempt to federate a failure. The first one is nature of colonial economy among the East African states. Kenya emerging from being a settler economy had inherited a strong industrial base and hence, the strongest economy in the region. Federation, which was not based on equal distribution of investments and benefits could mean a new form of exploitation of one African country over weak economies. In this context, Tanganyika and Uganda were demanding for equal distribution of investments so as to address such past imbalance. Nyerere forcefully argued against exploitation of one African country by another African country after independence.¹⁰ Tanzania and Uganda entered into negotiations of the East African Federation Constitution with a goal to improve their economic positions against Kenya.¹¹ Another major stumbling block came from Buganda Kingdom in Uganda. Historically, Buganda used to have its own special political status in Uganda and during colonial era it resisted the attempt towards federation. In Uganda it has been difficult to be the head of state without the support of the Baganda. Hence, while Buganda Kingdom was resisting a federal arrangement to preserve its status, Prime Minister Milton Obote needed them to sustain his political power. In this case, it was easy for Uganda to reject the federation. The other critical challenge towards establishment of the federation is the question of sovereignty.¹² Having a political federation means loss of sovereignty by individual states.

⁹ Julius K. Nyerere, ‘A United States of Africa’ (1963) 1, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1.

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Catherine Biira, *ibid.*, (n 7).

¹² Julius K. Nyerere (n 9)

It should be emphasised that East African states attained their respective independence between 1961 and 1963. It would be easy to think that when states are still new independently they can federate without delays, but the flipside of it is that new leaders wanted to enjoy powers. The critical questions could then be, 'who should be the president of the federation and what would be the status of the new states in a federation?'

Following failure to federate, other initiatives were called upon by East African leaders to have, in place, an institution whereby states would integrate, especially on economic terms. Hence, Kampala Agreement of 1964 was reached to address economic imbalances among the states. Following series of negotiations, in 1967, the EACSO was replaced by the Treaty for East African Cooperation (EAC). The first EAC Treaty of 1967 did not state any attempt to federate the East African countries probably due to past history. The Cooperation survived only for ten years and collapsed in 1977. There is consensus among scholars on factors that led to collapse of the EAC. They include such as inequitable distribution of costs and benefits among partner states; ideological differences among partner states (Tanzania practising Ujamaa, a form of socialism, Kenya implementing capitalism and Uganda the Common Man's charter); personality clashes between heads of state of Tanzania and Uganda (after Idi Amin's military coup against President Obote in 1971); operational problems facing the corporation; Kenya's refusal to fully effect decentralisation of the EAC Corporations and Services; and lack of engagement with citizens.¹³

4 Political Cycles of Federation in the current East African Community

After collapse of the first EAC in 1977, the three partner states and bilateral and multi-lateral creditors that had capital investments set-up a mechanism for dissolution of the Community. The purpose was to establish as well as divide assets and liabilities. The climax of such process was the EAC Mediation Agreement of 1984, which apart from its primary role of dividing assets and liabilities, it went further to identify areas for future cooperation. That was further consolidated by the Nairobi Communiqué of 1991 and later the Arusha meeting of 30th November, 1993 when the Heads of State of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania signed an agreement to revive cooperation among the three countries. The agreement culminated into establishment of Permanent Tripartite Commissions for Cooperation (PTCC) to promote cooperation in political, economic, cultural and security affairs. In March 1996, the PTCC Secretariat was inaugurated with its headquarters in Arusha. The PTCC then prepared the 1997-2000 East African Cooperation Development Strategy, which was approved by the heads of the three states. In due regard, the PTCC was directed by the heads of state to initiate negotiations so as to upgrade the agreement establishing the tripartite commission into a Treaty of the new EAC.

Scholars such as Baregu have forcefully argued that formation and sustenance of any regional integration scheme rests on four imperatives, namely, affection, gain, threat and power.¹⁴ He maintains that "affection" imperative means that countries come together due to some factors, which have created some bonds of affection. On "threat" imperative, Baregu refers to perception of a common external threat and hence, countries come

¹³ Msuya Mangachi (n 8) 109; Catherine Biira (n 7)

¹⁴ Mwesiga Baregu 'The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any Lessons from the EU?' in Rok Ajulu (ed), *The Making of a Region: Revival of the East African Community* (IGD House 2005) 45-62.

together to increase their capacity to defend themselves. Concerning “gain” imperative, Baregu finds out that countries will integrate as long as they clearly define what is in there for them irrespective of what their counterparts are likely going to gain. By “power” imperative, Baregu sees that a regional hegemony brings together neighbouring countries into an integration arrangement normally by force. Baregu notes that “threat” and “power” imperatives were not directly applicable to the revival of the EAC. Although he is of the view that “affection” and “gain” imperatives would be there, they were not strong enough to bind together partner states. It becomes even truer as the EAC has kept enlarging currently up to six partner states. In this section, we interrogate inclusion of political federation in the 1999 EAC Treaty as an ultimate goal of the integration. Moreover, we examine the impact of ambivalent game of fast-tracking and enlargement towards achieving political federation.

5 Negotiation and Inclusion of Political Federation in the EAC Treaty

East African political integration was rejected during colonial and post-independent periods. However, the treaty of EAC of 1999 has political federation as an ultimate goal of the East African integration. Article 5, Section 2 of the Treaty states that:

Partner States undertake to establish among themselves ... a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation in order to strengthen and regulate the industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other relations of the Partner States to the end that there shall be accelerated, harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefit of which shall be equitably shared.

In this part, we attempt to answer why and how the federation aim was negotiated and included in the EAC treaty. This is connected to the question what should be first, economic integration or political integration. Gilbert Khadiagala maintains that gradualism is a relevant approach for EAC integration.¹⁵ Indeed, he sees economic integration as a building block for political federation. However, other analysts hold a rather different view by stressing that:

The experience that East Africans have had since 1963 when then Heads of State called for an East African federation is apparent that placing economic considerations at the front of political unity as a foundation for an ultimate federation has not been achieved. In other words, the resolution to federate must be a political decision and not an economic decision.¹⁶

We argue that the federation project is an institutional legacy serving different purposes at particular setting and time. Revival of the East African Community was largely an effort of political leaders of the three states of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. They were drivers and owners of the process. A former Ugandan diplomat, involved in the processes, notes that, “The original idea of a political federation came from the political

¹⁵ EAC Summary of Deliberations of the 2nd EAC Dialogue on Political Integration: Exploring the Relationship between Political and Economic Integration Kunduchi Beach Hotel – Dar es Salaam 18 - 19 April 2012.

¹⁶ Mohabe Nyirabu ‘The Past, Present and Future of Integration in East Africa’ (2011) 5 *African Integration Review* 1, 1-31.

leaders.”¹⁷ An official from EAC Secretariat describes the heads of state's role by catchy words, “vision bearers.”¹⁸ Political federation was part of the very first guidelines given to the Permanent Tripartite Commission in-charge of drafting the EAC Treaty. The technocrats involved in the processes of negotiating the treaty were thus given the demanding task to implement visionary wishes of the EAC Summit.

Leaders of the three original members of the ‘second’ EAC expressed the aspiration of achieving the federation. The aspiration was echoed by presidents of Kenya and Tanzania in the 2nd Summit of Heads of State of East African Co-operation of 1997. In his speech, President Arap Moi of Kenya, reiterated that, “But once we have achieved the desired economic integration, it is my hope and dream that political federation for East Africa will finally be achieved.” Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania, added in his speech with somewhat more reservation that he hailed “the political understanding and respectful friendship between the three of us, and between our Governments and Peoples, which is what really propels us forward and underpins our journey towards an East African Common Market, and God willing, one day a Political Federation of East Africa.”

The aspiration of an East African Federation was pinned to a number of diverse reasons. One of the justification is “bonding of Partner States” around a joint political aspiration.¹⁹ Political integration was negotiated as a way to create a common position among the three states on what they wanted to achieve out of East African integration. There was need to avoid mistakes that led to failure of the first EAC in 1977, which, among other things, lacked political bond because it was much on economic relations.²⁰ One respondent noted that:

Political federation was included to 'hold it together.' And this is still viable today since if it was not the ultimate goal of political federation, some difficulties that the EAC had encountered may not have been resolved. But this goal holds them together to resolve their differences.²¹

Operation of the first EAC and its collapse left Uganda and Tanzania with negative views towards Kenya. At a time of negotiating for new EAC, political elites and the population still had a popular notion that Kenya exploited them economically during the life of the first EAC.²² Mwesiga Baregu argues that there was no strong affection among members of EAC to be sturdy imperative behind revival of EAC.²³ Against this backdrop, pursuing the goal of political integration in the new EAC provided a platform for rapprochement and changing of images between the partner states. Bonding was also important for economic integration, which needed sense of political mutual understanding, especially to Kenya. The end of the Cold War changed economic and political arrangements in the

¹⁷Interview with former officer, Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG02).

¹⁸ Interview with an Official from EAC Secretariat, EAC Headquarters, Arusha, Tanzania, 20 March 2018.

¹⁹ Interview with a Lecturer of Political Science from the University of Nairobi, 11 April 2018, Nairobi Tanzania (2018KEO1); Interview with EALA MP from Tanzania, 15 March 2018, Arusha, Tanzania.

²⁰ Interview with EALA MP from Burundi.

²¹ Interview with a Professor of Political Science from the University of Nairobi, 13 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya (2018KE02).

²² Nabudere Dani Wadada, ‘The Fast Tracking of Federation and Constitutionalism in East Africa’, paper Presented at Sir Udo Udoma Symposium, Makerere Law Society, Makerere University, Kampala April 2006.

²³ Mwesiga Baregu, ‘The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any Lessons from the EU?’ in Rok Ajulu (ed), *The Making of a Region: Revival of the East African Community* (IGD House 2005).

region. Moi thought the importance to integrate in East Africa as Kenya's capitalist idea against regional socialist ideas had no backup in the international arena. Kenya was no longer treated differently like during the Cold War. Thus, global politics at that time warranted the need for integration if a leader wanted to retain his grip on power. On this point, former Chief Justice of Kenya explains that, "To ensure that EAC integration lasts longer Kenya accepted the inclusion of political federation as an ultimate goal so that it could be counted to be in the same track with Tanzania and Uganda."²⁴ Political leadership in Kenya was desperate to ease economic pressure and access the East African market. As such, they needed to change their isolationist approach to integration for the sake of their economic interests.

Another justification for the federation is Pan-Africanism. Political integration was in line with Pan-Africanism spirit, which was the agenda of the then Organization of African Union [(OAU) now African Union, AU]. OAU advocated for political integration of Africa to attain great voice in the global arena.²⁵ It coincided with the role of Julius Nyerere, a staunch Pan-Africanist, in activities leading to revival of East African integration. Although stepped out of power in 1985, he had remained an influential figure in the region and throughout Africa. His presence in various activities of reviving the community, including signing of the treaty in 1999, vindicates his influence on inclusion of the federation aim in the Treaty as realization of Pan-Africanism.²⁶ Thus, when the Treaty was negotiated, political federation was included as a vision of the founding fathers, particularly to honour the legacy of Nyerere. Similarly, President Yoweri Museveni is another reason for inclusion of political federation in the Treaty as former diplomatic official from Tanzania noted that, "President Yoweri Museveni had a strong position and pushed for political federation to be included in the treaty. Although we may differ on his intention but we cannot deny the fact that he has remained consistent on realization of this goal by the EAC."²⁷

Museveni referred himself a committed Pan-Africanist and a student of Julius Nyerere. He maintains a position that economic and social prosperity of Africa and the third world at large can only be attained through forming a political block. Such block would create leverage in trade and economic negotiations with world powers.²⁸ This stance is also reflected in the constitution of Museveni's political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM).²⁹ Museveni has maintained his position even when leadership of other

²⁴ Interview with a former Chief Justice of Kenya, 13 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya (2018KE04).

²⁵ Mohabe Nyirabu, *Miundo ya Shirikisho: Nadharia na Uzoefu wa Nebi Nyingine* (REDET 2008), Catherine P Biira, *Crafting a Political Union: Collective Identity Dynamics in the East African Community* (CUEA PRESS 2017)

²⁶ Issa Shivji, 'Pan Africanism and the Challenge of East African Community Integration', in Magaga Alot and Magrit Mueller (eds), *East African Integration: The Rise and Rise of the East African Community*; Proceedings of the EAC 10th Anniversary Symposium held at the Snowcrest Hotel Arusha 13-14 November 2009 (EAC & GIZ: 2010); Interview with the EAC official in the Office of Deputy Secretary – Political Federation, 13 March 2018, Arusha Tanzania; Interview with an official from Kenya Ministry of East African Affairs, 12 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.

²⁷ Interview with a former Diplomat from Tanzania, 3 October 2018, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (2018TZ03).

²⁸ Yoweri K Museveni, President of Uganda, State of EAC Address to the Members of the East African Legislative Assembly, 24 April 2013, Kigali, Rwanda.

²⁹ The National Resistance Movement (NRM), 'The Constitution of the National Resistance Movement' (2003).

countries has lost interests in the federation agenda.³⁰ Furthermore, political integration was included to harness security cooperation in the region. Apart from Tanzania, other EAC Partner States were facing security problems at their borders. Kenya was facing problems of insurgency in its northern border, in particular, to Somalia. On the other hand, Uganda was entrenched in a war with Lord Resistance Army rebels in the North. As military and security relations were to become part of the federation agenda, partner states saw an opportunity of addressing their security concerns. Currently, military and security cooperation are the most effective areas of EAC integration.³¹ As it will be discussed in the subsequent section, security threats have continued to be a driver of integration.

As we have noted, the East African integration project was largely a summit agenda. Technocrats who negotiated the treaty had no power to rejecting the political federation proposal despite being unrealistic. For them, the EAC was supposed to be a regional economic integration, which had to start with customs union, common market and monetary union. To balance interests of both sides, the federation was included in the treaty but as an ultimate goal. Framing of political integration in the Treaty does not reflect enthusiasm shown by the summit. Political federation is framed in the treaty as an aspiration of the community. One national government official responsible for EAC affairs argues that, “those who drafted the treaty were very clever to put political federation as an ultimate goal without including the timeline to attain it. They knew that it was a very difficult goal to accomplish.”³² The way political federation was included in the Treaty was a compromise for interests of the summit and treaty negotiators.

6 The Fast-Tracking Initiative (2004 and 2013)

The East Africa Heads of State Summit held in Nairobi from 27th to 29th August, 2004 noticed slow pace of integration processes particularly realization of Article 5(2) of the EAC Treaty. The summit pondered ways and means of deepening as well as accelerating the process. It “resolved to expedite and compress the integration process so that the ultimate goal of the political federation would be achieved through a fast track mechanism.”³³ There were questions as to why the Summit opted for political federation as panacea for achieving integration while a number of economic integration processes, stipulated in the Treaty, were yet to be realized to warrant thinking of federating. The summit thought that attaining political federation would help to achieve other aspects of integration. Economic integration was not working because there was no political power to enforce the Treaty. These arguments resembled those of colonial times where the federation was proposed as method for attaining efficiency.

The summit appointed a committee on Fast Tracking of East African Federation, famously known as ‘Wako Committee’ and it commenced its work on 21st September, 2004. It conducted wide consultation with people of the three countries of Kenya,

³⁰ Interview with a member of Tanzania National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking Political Federation, 3 September, Morogoro, Tanzania (2018TZ01). This observation was also shared by the officers at the EAC Head Quarters in Arusha.

³¹ Interview with an official from EAC Secretariat, 20 March 2018, EAC Headquarters, Arusha, Tanzania.

³² Interview with a government official responsible for EAC affairs, 11 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya.

³³ EAC, ‘Joint Communiqué for the East African Heads of State Summit’, Nairobi, 27-29 August 2004.

Uganda and Tanzania. The committee submitted its report on 26th November, 2009 with a proposal for 1st January, 2010 as a date to launch the East African Political Federation. The committee recommended that, “the establishment of the Political Federation should not wait for all expectations of the EAC integration to be realized. Rather, focus should be only on those areas considered to be necessary and sufficient for establishing the Federation.”³⁴ Based on views from East African people, the committee saw the need for building blocks to lay down strong foundations for federation. East Africans wanted to know and own integration processes. Considering this reality, the committee was of the view that “a sound foundation is needed to create a sustainable Political Federation. One contributor to such sustainability requires that the process towards Political Federation be reached through public mobilization pressure rather than through executive decision.”³⁵ The committee further noted fear from loss of sovereignty as a major obstacle to attain federation. The fear was mainly from political elites rather than from the population. The observation coincides with the view from the EAC ministry official who notes that:

For common people, there is no fear. The fear is on leaders and elites. We, from the ministry, have observed that people in the grassroots do not care what is taking place at national or regional level. They have shown positive views towards having a political federation so that they can move freely across the region. It is rather the leaders who echo the argument that people have a fear on the loss of their national sovereignty.³⁶

This is, however, a contradiction as the same actors pushing for political federation are also concerned about losing their power to govern.

To facilitate fast tracking processes, at its 10th Meeting held from 8th to 9th August 2005, the EAC Council of Ministers established the post of Deputy Secretary for Political Federation. The office is tasked with overseeing and coordinating the process of fast tracking the East African Federation. In 2006, Beatrice Kiraso from Uganda was appointed to hold the respective post. Uganda was given privilege to appoint the first Deputy Secretary for Political Federation as President Museveni was a leader in pushing for political integration in the summit.³⁷ The official from the civil society from Uganda posited that, “Since fast tracking of political federation was sponsored by Uganda and the creation of a department for political federation at the EAC headquarters was in the political interest of Uganda: Deputy Secretary General, Beatrice Kiraso, was a Ugandan extension of ‘our’ [political integration] project.”³⁸

Moreover, individual states formed National Consultative Committees on East African political federation. The committees were tasked to sensitize people and collect their views on the federation and its fast-tracking. While majority of Kenyans and Ugandans were positive on the agenda, Tanzanians were hesitant. For instance, in Kenya, 70% supported the federation and 65% supported its fast-tracking.³⁹ In Uganda, 81% and 73.8% of individuals at households and key informants, respectively, supported the federation.

³⁴ East African Community, ‘Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation’, EAC Secretariat Arusha, Tanzania (August 2004).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Interview with a former diplomat from Tanzania, 3rd October 2018, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (2018TZ03).

³⁸ Interview with an official from Kituo cha Katiba, 28 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG05).

³⁹ Republic of Kenya, ‘Report of National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking East African Political Federation’, Nairobi, Kenya (2007).

Similarly, 75.2% and 63.8% of such groups, respectively, supported fast-tracking. Those against deep political integration cited loss of national identity, political instability and one leader noted being unable to govern all countries.⁴⁰ As for Tanzania, 75.9% did not support fast tracking. Among other things, they cited different levels of economic development, the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, land, ability to compete in labour market and business as reasons for rejecting fast tracking.⁴¹ After these popular views, the federation project lost attraction from both the Summit and people. Leaders explained that they were directing efforts in sensitizing the populations towards political integration because they could not ignore their concerns. This was another way of exiting from the fast tracking agenda as no timeline was given for consultation. However, the project was not cancelled, being an institutionalized aspiration codified in the Treaty.

In 2013, there was a second fast-tracking attempt. The attempt came after Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda became frustrated on the pace of integration particularly hesitation by some members. The three held series of meetings without involvement of Tanzania and Burundi. The first was held between 24th and 25th June, 2013 in Entebbe, Uganda, the second was on 28th August, 2013 in Mombasa, Kenya, and the third was held on 28th October, 2013 in Kigali, Rwanda. In all meetings, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda agreed on a number of issues including the Single Customs Territory and Fast Tracking of the East African Political Federation. The joint co-operation of the three countries renamed itself as the “Coalition of the Willing” (CoW). Expressing his sentiments on the move by the three member states, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the president of Tanzania remarked:

Truly, I ask myself many questions without answers as to what is being done by our fellow leaders of the three states and why? Is it that our colleagues have no confidence on the EAC and hence establish their own? Or do they hate our country and so they want to provoke us to disintegrate? I would want to assure you that we have no plans to do that.⁴²

President Kikwete held further that, “our colleagues argue that they did so because they think they are ready. But who is not ready? Did they invite us in the first place? We believe that this argument is baseless.”⁴³ The move by the three member states can also be attributed to long standing feelings that Tanzania has been an obstacle to the fast tracking process of the political federation. This is due to its position on the pace towards the federation. Presenting Tanzania’s position on this, President Kikwete maintained that, “There have been allegations by some of our colleagues that Tanzania has no good intentions for the furtherance and strengthening of the EAC and that we have been the obstacle to the fast trackers. They argue that if it were not for Tanzania, the EAC would have been far by now.”⁴⁴

This attempt to federate came at a time Tanzania had bad diplomatic relationship with Rwanda and it was locked in serious trade as well as economic disputes with Kenya. The 2013 fast-tracking was mainly on economic integration. Among other things, the coalition was to work on telecommunications, infrastructure, defence and tourism in the

⁴⁰ Government of Uganda, ‘Report of National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking East African Political Federation’, Kampala, Uganda (June 2007).

⁴¹ United Republic of Tanzania, ‘Report of the Committee for Gathering on Fast Tracking the Formation of East African Political Federation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (30 June 2007).

⁴² United Republic of Tanzania (2013) Presidential Speech to the National Assembly, 7 November 2013.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Northern Corridor. That would have solidified cooperation among the three countries. However, such initiatives fell apart when Uganda skipped Kenya and gave the oil pipeline deal to Tanzania while Rwanda agreed with Tanzania to use and develop the central corridor. Oddly, the President of the Republic of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta in his speech on 25th March, 2014 to the East African Legislative Assembly in Arusha, noted economic challenges among member states as one of the stumbling blocks to achievement of political federation. He stated that integration is a process and not an event.⁴⁵

From the fast tracking initiatives, a number of conclusions can be drawn. EAC says it shall be people-centred, but political integration agenda is driven by the Summit.⁴⁶ The Summit is both driver and spoiler of the processes. The Summit often neglects reservations of technocrats – but also of subordinate politicians – when it pushes for its agendas. For instance, there was no money for economic integration, but out of a sudden, a budget of political federation was available and allocated.⁴⁷ Official documents suggest as cited that to the Summit, political federation was paramount over economic integration. At least, the Summit did not hinder members who pushed for activities suggesting that the EAC would move toward political integration. What we cannot know is if the Summit – as some observers propose – only gave in to President Museveni’s wish while voluntarily delaying implementation or if the Summit agreed on doing ‘something harmless’ in order to keep the entire fragile integration process going. Fast tracking mirrors the ambivalence of political signals from the Summit about its real commitment to political integration. As for the fast tracking of 2004, the summit used the outcome of consultation processes as an exit from the federation agenda. Summit members are unwilling to partially cede sovereignty by referring back to fears in domestic populations. Such political cycles keep taking place whenever the agenda of political federation is raised. Also, the Office of Deputy Secretary for Political Federation has no capacity to spearhead realization of political federation. We observed that the office’s scope of activities is huge and vague. This hinders its efficiency. For instance, issues related to security, peace and political affairs are all lumped under the docket. The secretariat is largely dealing with issues related to conflict resolution, security and peace within individual states as opposed to activities related to fostering political integration.⁴⁸

Moreover, people in the region, including Uganda, see a push for federation tied to Museveni’s personal interests of becoming ascending to power seat. One respondent from Uganda opined that, “aspirations of the President of Uganda to become the first president of an East African Federation shape interest in political integration.” Museveni is the longest serving president in the region and hence, he is seeing himself as the “ordained leader of the community” and the “stabilizer of the region.”⁴⁹ This argument is further clarified by an expert from Makerere University who posits that: “Museveni is pushing for fast tracking of Political Federation. He might still believe that he could become the first president of an East African Federation since this could become a matter

⁴⁵ East African Legislative Assembly, Arusha, Tanzania March 25, 2014: President Uhuru Kenyatta today delivered the State of EAC Address at a Special Sitting at the EALA Chambers in Arusha, Tanzania.

⁴⁶ Catherine Biira, *Ibid.*, Feza Lwaitama, James Kasombo & Kitila Mkumbo (eds), ‘A Synthesis Research Report on the Participation of Citizens in the East African Community Integration Process’.

⁴⁷ Interview with former MP (from Uganda) in the 1st EALA, 29 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG06).

⁴⁸ Interview with an official from EAC Secretariat, 20 March 2018, EAC Headquarters, Arusha, Tanzania.

⁴⁹ Interview with a Researcher and Consultant from Uganda, 23 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG01).

of seniority.”⁵⁰ Furthermore, fast tracking attempts have increased disunity and mistrust in the regional bloc. For instance, formation of CoW in 2013 further complicated political integration process by creating mistrust in the bloc. Tanzania was pushed to focus much on Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), while Burundi sought for joining SADC to evade a hard time in the EAC.⁵¹ To sum up, fast tracking initiatives appear to be expressions of the same strategy of ‘procrastination’ of the project of political federation instead of having a specific impact.

7 Enlargement of the EAC (2007 and 2016)

Article 3(1) and (2) of the EAC Treaty provides for admission of new members in the bloc. Since its establishment in 1999, the block has enlarged from three – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania – to six member states. Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. There are also prospects for Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia to join. While enlargement of the EAC proves success in implementation of Treaty objectives, it also brings challenges on deepening of integration such as political instability in some member states like Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi; lack of clarity on the process leading to integration; and structural including institutional obstacles such as protectionism by member states on the movement of capital, goods, and people.⁵² We should capitalise that political integration is one aspect that has seriously been affected by enlargement.⁵³ Member states in the regional bloc have to develop deep and strong economic, political and social relations, which will sustain their integration. Indeed, those relations have to be guided by shared standards, values and beliefs, which ultimately are institutionalized in the bloc. Other states wishing to join the block should first subscribe to these institutional values. It was on this ground that Sudan’s application to join the bloc was rejected in 2011. Among other things, Tanzania and Uganda cited democratic practices and treatment of women as a reason for rejection.⁵⁴ However, the EAC seems to give prominence on enlargement over deepening. Consequently, enlargement has complicated EAC integration agenda. There is greater diversity of national interests as a University of Nairobi lecturer contends that:

In reality, things would have been different if the EAC had remained with three member states. Some steps in economic and political integration would have taken place. More members with different background mean more political thinking in decision making. As such decision making becomes slower and uneasy as they should accommodate a lot of diverse interests.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Interview with a Professor of Political Science at Makerere University, 27 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG04).

⁵¹ Ronald Musoke, ‘Analysis: Lessons from Burundi Move to SADC’, *The Independent* (20 March 2017) <www.independent.co.ug/analysis-lessons-burundis-sadc-move>.

⁵² Mohabe Nyirabu ‘The Past, Present and Future of Integration in East Africa’, *African Integration Review*, (2011) 5, 1,1-31.

⁵³ Rasul Ahmed and Lupa Ramadhani, ‘Ogezeko la Wanachama wa Jumuiya ya Afrika Mashariki: Manufaa na Changamoto’, (REDET: 2008).

⁵⁴ Mwaura Kimani, ‘Why Sudan failed in its Bid to Join the EAC’, *Daily Monitor*, <www.monitor.co.ug/News/World/688340-1290290-hdxi2fz/index.html> (17 December 2017).

⁵⁵ Interview with Professor of Political Science from University of Nairobi, 13 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya (2018KE02).

Diversities of national interests are due to the fact that enlargement is happening against shared political values among partner states and there is no effort to cultivate them. As a result, the bloc is used as another arena of projecting competing national interests. Often, the rationales of admitting new members in the EAC stem from partner states' interests rather than those of the community. Rwanda was admitted for economic interests supported by Uganda. Burundi was admitted for Tanzania's interest of balancing power in the bloc and maintaining security in Burundi.⁵⁶ South Sudan, on the other hand, joined the bloc due to Uganda's security and economic interests. Similarly, discussions of Somalia to join the bloc stem from Kenya's security interests supported by Uganda.⁵⁷

Article 3(3)(b) of the Treaty prescribes values, which should be adhered to by any foreign state wishing to join the EAC. They are: "adherence to universally acceptable principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, observance of human rights and social justice." However, looking at admission of South Sudan and prospects for Somalia membership one fails to see consideration of these values in granting membership. A former EALA MP from Uganda argues that:

The enlargement made the achievement of political integration more difficult. Rules and obligations have been neglected. South Sudan did not meet the benchmarks for admission. It would be similar for Somalia. Basic values are not shared. Two member states [Rwanda and Burundi] are even at war. Do you really want to enter a federation with countries at war?⁵⁸

The decision to grant membership is done by the EAC Summit, which works under brotherhood spirit. Bureaucrats' views who carry out assessments on compliance levels to values set in the treaty by countries seeking for membership are often neglected by political leaders.⁵⁹ Consequently, institutions of some newly admitted members are very weak to warrant them being in the EAC. Unless they are reformed, the problems will remain. Even when other actors raise these concerns, they are not heard – despite the bloc claiming to be "people centred." For instance, Kituo Cha Katiba – an EAC civil society organization – opined against admitting South Sudan because of bad situation of human rights, peace, stability and democracy, which was against requirements of the Treaty. The views were, however, neglected by the Summit. Finally, South Sudan was granted membership by the summit as it cited a need to address the country's domestic security problems.⁶⁰ Similarly, EAC member states think that admitting neighbouring states into the EAC can help them to tackle security threats coming from these states. For them, it is easy to deal with a country when it is in the bloc rather than when it is outside.⁶¹ Enlargement, however, has become a spoiler to integration processes. Time and resources, which could be used for deepening the integration, are spent on addressing

⁵⁶ Biira (n 7); Juma Mwapachu, 'Challenging the Frontiers of African Integration: The Dynamics of Policies, Politics and Transformation in the East African Community, (E&D Vision Publishing: Dar es Salaam, 2012).

⁵⁷ Biira (n 7); interview with EALA MP from South Sudan, 18 March 2018; Interview with an Official from EAC Secretariat, 19 March, 2018.

⁵⁸ Interview with former MP (from Uganda) in the 1st EALA, 29 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG06).

⁵⁹ Biira (n 7); interview with an official from EAC Secretariat, 19 March 2018, Arusha, Tanzania.

⁶⁰ Interview with EALA MP from Tanzania, 15 March 2018, Arusha, Tanzania, Interview with EALA MP from Sudan, 18 March 2018, Arusha, Tanzania.

⁶¹ Interview with an official from EAC Secretariat, 20 March 2018, EAC Headquarters, Arusha, Tanzania.

internal issues of new member states. Moreover, enlargement without deepening has resulted into formation of coalitions of members with the bloc. New members align themselves with those who sponsored their membership. One retired official from Uganda pinpoints the genesis and reality of this problem drawing from Rwanda and Burundi membership in the EAC:

Rwanda and Burundi wanted to join by the mid-2000s. Divisions between Uganda and Tanzania facilitated the compromise that both, Rwanda and Burundi, should be allowed to join despite these countries' differences. After the enlargement, new coalitions emerged in the EAC: Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda vs. Tanzania and Burundi.⁶²

These coalitions have been weakening the EAC. The 2013 fast-tracking initiatives, which took the line of these coalitions can be cited as an example.

Lack of deepening of the community among membership complicates attaining political integration through different ways. There are competing interests in the EAC. Kenya is much focused on economic integration. Kenya as a regional economic superpower is concerned with business opportunities. Such an approach leads to suspicion from other members, as a lecturer from Nairobi University aptly put it that, "Kenya's ambitious goal for economic federation puts it at odds with other member states since they view Kenya as a state seeking economic domination under the regional integration."⁶³ In the same vein, implementation of Common Market has been difficult to attain as member states are sceptical of consequences of the four market freedoms due to the strong economic difference to Kenya. For instance, Tanzanians fear that "Kenyans will come and buy all land."⁶⁴ As for Uganda, approach in the EAC is much shaped by the quest for political integration driven by Museveni's personal interests, discussed elsewhere in this paper. However, Museveni lacks credentials to push for this agenda due to nature of politics he pursues in Uganda. Such feelings emerged even from the population during National Consultation on Political Federation. The population in Uganda was sceptical that once a federal state is created and their president becomes its head, he can change the constitution to prolong his stay in power as he has done at home.⁶⁵ Museveni's aspiration puts him at odd with other bloc leaders as an official from the Civil Society from Uganda posits that, "Aspiration of the President of Uganda to become the first president of an East African Federation shapes interest in political integration. But do the leaders trust each other? Is any of the current leaders suitable to lead an East African Federation given all the governance issues at the domestic level?"⁶⁶

Tanzania, on the other hand, takes a cautious approach towards both economic and political integration. It has advocated for go slow process towards integration. There are different explanations to this new approach from Tanzania. The first is experience from the past where its efforts on political federation were frustrated by Kenya's economic interests and Uganda domestic situation. It was followed by creation of the first EAC,

⁶² Interview with a former official from Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda (2018UG02).

⁶³ Interview with a Political Science Lecturer from University of Nairobi, 11 April 2018, Nairobi, Kenya (2018KE01).

⁶⁴ Philip Mwakio 'Tanzanian Opposition Leader Explains Fears over EAC', *The Standard* <www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/11444003301/tanzanian-opposition-leader-explains-fears-over-eac> (5th January 2009).

⁶⁵ Government of Uganda, 'Report of National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking East African Political Federation', (Kampala June 2007)

⁶⁶ Interview with Official from the Civil Society, 28 March 2018, Kampala, Uganda.

which was largely benefiting Kenya at the expense of other member states. When the bloc collapsed in 1977, Tanzania was a net loser. As such, Tanzania does not want to repeat past mistakes by being a market for Kenya because it may affect its growing economy with relatively small industrial base.⁶⁷ However, a former Kenyan Chief Justice gives another account on Tanzania's stance by positing that:

A new cadre of leaders in Tanzania is different from Nyerere. They don't much share his ideas despite their public praise of Nyerere. They have inward-looking approach. Other members have the same problem as there is no one in leadership who can give alternative vision on attaining political federation.⁶⁸

Nevertheless, Tanzania is more politically integrated with Southern Africa than in Eastern Africa. It contributed in the liberation struggles against colonialism in Southern African States. Tanzania hosted liberation fighters and leaders from South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Liberation struggles provided shared values and beliefs between Tanzania and those states thereby becoming another form of integration. SADC, which Tanzania is actively engaged and respected, is a product of this integration. Hence, for Tanzania, SADC has been a safe sanctuary when things are not working in EAC. It is against this backdrop that creation of CoW, in 2013, was mitigated by closer ties between Tanzania and SADC.⁶⁹ When Tanzania felt isolated, it turned to SADC. Kenya, on the other hand, did not share Tanzania's view towards liberation of Africa because it was aligned with the West for economic benefits. That history has never been reconciled to warrant strong shared values even in the new EAC. This makes political federation difficult to achieve.

8 Conclusion

At the beginning, we asked two interrelated research questions: why an ambitious aim as formation of a political federation was included in the Treaty for Establishment of the East African Community of 1999? What prospects for accomplishment of this institutional mission are at this point in time? Findings from this study reveal a number of conclusions. First, political federation is a long institutional history merging colonial and post-colonial aspirations. As the colonial project, its logic was efficiency and lower costs. As the post-colonial project, the logic was African unity and service delivery. Hence, political federation, as an ultimate end of EAC, was included in the Treaty just for bonding the Partner States around a joint aspiration. Secondly, fast-tracking initiatives deepened the divide thereby complicating political federation. Each country has its own interests to serve but all fear from losing political sovereignty. Countries, which considered themselves ready for political federation had already calculated and satisfied with either economic or political gains likely to enjoy after formation of the federation. Similarly,

⁶⁷ Interview with a former Diplomat from Tanzania, 3 October 2018, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (2018TZ03); Interview with a member of Tanzania National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking Political Federation, 15 September, Dodoma, Tanzania (2018TZ01); Interview with an MP of Tanzania Union Parliament and a Member of Tanzania National Consultative Committee on Fast Tracking Political Federation, 18 September 2018, Kigoma, Tanzania (2018TZ02).

⁶⁸ Interview with a Former Chief Justice of Kenya, 13 April 2013, Nairobi, Kenya (2018KE04)

⁶⁹ Alon Mwesiga, 'EAC: Why 'coalition' states need Tanzania', *The Observer* <www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=27658&catid=79&Itemid=68> (24th September 2013).

enlargement of EAC has made political integration highly difficult because it increases great diversity of national interests. Thirdly, political federation has remained the EAC 'summit project.' Keeping political federation on the agenda means different things to different actors administratively, ideologically and politically. Therefore, a fair balance of the political integration agenda is politically needed to keep the economic integration process going. It is against this backdrop that the confederation has currently been opted as part of a necessary lag strategy with preference for non-implementation of the federation.